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SYMPOSIUM
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE GOOD
SOCIETY
EDITORS' FOREWORD

On September 22nd and 23rd, 2000, Fordham University School of
Law held the second in a series of conferences in constitutional
theory.! Over twenty outstanding scholars convened to examine a
number of questions concerning the relationship between the
Constitution and the good society.
Questions for general
consideration included: Can the Constitution be fairly interpreted to
commit "We the People" to pursuing a plausible version of the good
society? Are its provisions and the scheme of government that it
establishes adequate to that end?
To the contrary, do the
Constitution's commitments and omissions make it unlikely that the
People will seek, much less attain, a good society?
Do the
institutional structures created by the Constitution help or hinder the
development of a good society? How can constitutional government
facilitate progress toward a good society?
The conference was organized into five panels, whose
presentations and deliberations were guided by the following
questions:
Panel 1. The Constitution of Civic Virtue for a Good Society: Does
the Constitution require or presuppose a formative project of
government inculcating in citizens the civic virtue necessary to
promote and sustain a good society? Does it thwart or indeed forbid
such a project? To what extent can the institutions of civil society
support or even supplant government in cultivating civic virtue?
What is the content of the civic virtue that should be inculcated in
circumstances of moral disagreement and how does it relate to
traditional moral virtue? Does it include respect for and appreciation
of diversity? Should a formative project include cultivating attitudes
that are critical of practices that deny liberty and equality?
1. The first, in 1996, on Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, was published in the
March issue of Volume 65 of the Fordham Law Review.
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Panel 2. The Constitution of Equal Citizenship for a Good Society:
Does the Constitution secure the preconditions for the status of equal
citizenship of everyone? Does it obligate the government to eradicate
the vestiges of caste systems? Beyond that, does it obligate the
government affirmatively to secure the preconditions for the capable
and effective exercise of basic liberties by all citizens? Do the
Constitution's protections of certain freedoms and of equality itself
limit what government may do to secure equal citizenship for all? Is it
permissible or even imperative to regulate certain basic liberties, such
as freedom of expression and freedom of association, for the sake of
securing equal citizenship for members of groups who are subject to
hostility or oppression on the basis of race, gender, or sexual
orientation? Does the Constitution's commitment to equal citizenship
constrain any formative project of inculcating civic virtue?
Panel 3. The Constitution and the Obligations of Government to
Secure the Material Preconditions for a Good Society: Does the
Constitution obligate the government to secure or facilitate the
material preconditions for a good society, for example, by
guaranteeing a social minimum of goods and services to meet the
basic needs of all citizens? Or is provision for such preconditions
constitutionally gratuitous?
Indeed, does the Constitution's
protection of property rights and economic liberties hinder or even
preclude governmental provision for the material well-being of all?
Furthermore, should we reorient constitutional theory toward
discourse concerning the political economy of citizenship and
questions such as "What economic arrangements are hospitable to
self-government?"
Panel 4. The Constitution Outside the Courts and the Pursuit of a
Good Society: What is the relationship between the commitments of
our Constitution and those of a good society? Is there a tenable
distinction between the partial, judicially enforceable Constitution
and the whole Constitution that is binding outside the courts upon
legislatures, executives, and citizens generally and, if so, what are the
criteria for drawing that distinction? What is the best account of the
thinness of our Constitution and our constitutional law, as compared
with our thicker commitments to justice and a good society? Is such
thinness a flaw or a virtue of our practice? What revisions of our
practice would be necessary to give rigorous and coherent meaning to
the idea of taking the Constitution seriously outside the courts?
Panel 5. ConstitutionalInterpretation and Aspirations to a Good
Society: What form should constitutional interpretation by courts
take in light of our aspirations to a good society? Should courts
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engage in "moral readings" of the Constitution, for example, by
elaborating abstract moral principles of liberty and equality or by
making moral arguments about fostering human goods or virtues? Or
should courts avoid such moral readings in favor of "judicial
minimalism" and deciding one case at a time in order to leave matters
open for democratic deliberation and decision? What should be the
respective roles of interpretation and amendment (whether through
Article V or outside it) in responding to imperfections in the
Constitution?
Does the quest for fidelity in constitutional
interpretation further the pursuit of a good society or to the contrary
undermine it? Should constitutional interpretation be more forwardlooking and instrumental, pursuant to our aspirations to a good
society, than most conceptions of constitutional interpretation
contemplate or permit?
Fordham Law Review is honored to publish here the papers
presented by the panelists, augmented and revised in many cases in
light of the colloquy that followed each panel. The papers, for the
most part, follow the order in which they were presented at the
conference.
We would like to thank Dean John D. Feerick for his support, and
the Fordham University School of Law Office of Academic Programs,
in particular Helen Herman and Susan Doherty, for their help in the
planning and administering of this conference. We greatly appreciate
Fordham Professors James E. Fleming, Martin S. Flaherty, Abner S.
Greene, Tracy E. Higgins, Robert J. Kaczorowski, William M.
Treanor, and Benjamin C. Zipursky, who worked together in
conceiving the conference and many of whom wrote papers or
moderated panels. We also are considerably indebted to the coorganizers and co-sponsoring institutions: Professor Stephen L. Elkin
of the University of Maryland, who is Chair of the Executive Board of
the Committee on the Political Economy of the Good Society
(PEGS); Mark V. Tushnet, Carmack Waterhouse Professor of
Constitutional Law at Georgetown University Law Center; Lawrence
G. Sager, Robert B. McKay Professor at New York University School
of Law, and Sotirios A. Barber, Professor of Government at the
University of Notre Dame. Our deepest gratitude is to Professor
James E. Fleming, who served as the lead co-organizer of the
conference and who acted as our liason in the gathering and editing of
the papers in this issue of the Fordhan Law Review.
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